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why DeFence co-opeRATion?
The May NATO Summit in Chicago ended with 
a call on member-states to spend their money 
on the right priorities, to start specialising instead 
of duplicating each other’s efforts, and to seek 
economies of scale in collaboration. The Alliance 
calls this three-pronged approach ‘smart defence’, 
and it makes much sense, especially in the current 
tight fiscal environment. Even before the crisis, most 
NATO countries have lost the will to finance the 
broad-spectrum militaries they inherited from the 
Cold War. 
For decades, the allies had been hollowing out the 
parts of their forces that they had ceased properly 
to fund, but were too skittish to abolish. The crisis 
has now savaged the European defence budgets: 
in one year alone, in 2009, eight European allies 
made double-digit percentage cuts in military 
spending (seven of the eight were new NATO allies 
from Central Europe and the Balkans).1 To make 
things worse, the cost of military equipment has 
been steadily rising; the UK Ministry of Defence says 
it pays 4 per cent more each year to replace old 
equipment with equivalent new models.2 
The combination of higher costs and shrinking 
budgets has devastated military capabilities: 
manpower in European armed forces has dropped 
by 18 per cent in Germany and 36 per cent in France 
since 2007.3 The crisis has also had some salutary 
effects: it has forced governments to start making 
overdue changes to their defence posture – the 
Dutch and the Danes, for example, have largely 
eliminated tank forces, for which they see little use 
in the future. Such prioritisation, however, will make 
limited difference in some countries – after years of 
downsizing, there is little ‘fat’ left in most European 
militaries, and with not much waste left to eliminate, 
countries will find it difficult to make significant 
savings in defence budgets. 
Specialisation – the second pillar of smart defence – 
could yield far more promising returns: in principle it 
allows some countries to forgo certain capabilities, 
and focus on strengthening their expertise in other 
areas. In practice, specialisation creates political 
dependencies on other states, for which most NATO 
governments are ill-prepared.4 
Collaboration – or ‘pooling and sharing’ in EU 
parlance – therefore emerges as the most promising 
money-saver among the three prongs of smart 
defence. Because it creates less critical inter-state 
dependencies than specialisation, governments 
are more open to it. And NATO member-states 
have much on which they could collaborate. There 
is a great contrast between the integrated way 
in which NATO countries fight wars (they supply 
each other’s troops, guard each other’s bases, 
and fight together) and the completely insular way 
in which they prepare for conflict: multinational 
military colleges are a rarity, as are joint acquisitions 
of equipment or co-operation on servicing or 
upgrading equipment. This inward-looking mentality 
was wasteful in good economic times; in crisis 
it becomes unaffordable. Since the economies 
soured, even such proud military powers as the 
United Kingdom and France have agreed to form 
a strategic partnership by signing a 50-year treaty 
on collaboration. 
collAboRATion: sensible in 
pRinciple, DeVilishly DiFFiculT in 
pRAcTice
But how can more countries be encouraged to form 
defence partnerships? If collaboration was easy, 
many more allies would be pooling and sharing. 
Instead, most of the past attempts have failed to 
save money or produce useful units. The Germans 
and the French built a joint brigade but have never 
deployed it; so great are the differences in their 
attitudes to the use of force. While some common 
acquisitions worked well — NATO’s fleet of AWACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft 
comes to mind — many others were howlers, such as 
the US-Italian-German MEADS (Medium Extended 
Air Defence System) program, which is eleven 
years behind schedule, 50 per cent over budget 
and close to collapse (the US wants to discontinue 
funding). Collaboration as such is no panacea; 
if not approached properly, it can become an 
expensive failure. 
Past research5 suggests that for countries to form 
successful partnerships, several criteria have to be 
met: 
4   |   DAV4 Full Report
Fundamental Criteria
•  Similarity of strategic cultures: when countries 
build joint units, they should choose partners with 
comparable views on when and how to use force. 
When partners disagree over where and with what 
‘caveats’ (limitations on types of operations) their 
combined force is to be deployed, they risk not 
being able to use it at all – much as the French 
and the Germans have found when they tried to 
use their combined brigade. Naturally, similarity of 
strategic cultures will be more pertinent in cases 
where countries pool capabilities that are meant 
to be deployed or those that directly support 
deployed forces; it will be less relevant in cases 
where countries pool training grounds or storage 
facilities, which can also bring substantial savings;
•  Trust and solidarity: these factors are especially 
important when the forces that partners choose 
to combine are responsible, directly or indirectly, 
for defending home territories: governments want 
to be confident that their partners will not leave 
them without access to shared assets in times of 
crisis at home. Trust is often the key difference that 
determines whether joint projects save money or 
not: the MEADS project, for example, is meant to 
replace existing Hawk and Patriot missile defences. 
But because participating countries have had 
so little confidence in one another and in the 
programme’s success, they have also pursued 
other national alternatives to MEADS. Instead 
of saving money by pooling their research and 
procurement they effectively paid twice;
•  Forces of similar size and quality: the trouble with 
collaboration between big and small countries 
is that the big ones do not always take smaller 
partners seriously. The United States has frustrated its 
European allies to no end by constantly changing 
timelines for the multinational but US-led F-35 fighter 
jet programme. In most cases, co-operation among 
countries of comparable size will work better than 
the alternative; asymmetry in size raises fears of one 
side ‘dominating’ the other and ignoring the smaller 
party’s needs, thus undermining the all-important 
trust. Similarly, countries with advanced militaries will 
want to work with equally sophisticated partners. 
UK defence officials can sometimes be dismissive 
of pooling because they see their forces as the 
best in Europe. France, with whom they eventually 
agreed a co-operation treaty, is arguably the only 
power on the continent that can match the size 
and technological prowess of the UK military;
•  Level playing field for defence companies: pooling 
and sharing saves money mainly by allowing the 
participating states to reduce the amount of 
equipment or services they buy. But this invariably 
means that some company somewhere will not 
receive an order that it would have received 
otherwise. For partnerships to work and endure, 
these losses must be evenly spread. If some 
countries protect their defence companies more 
than others, these asymmetries create friction that 
can cause co-operation to unravel;
•  Clarity of intentions: some countries enter into co-
operative projects because they want to save 
money (the Nordics, for example), others because 
they want to encourage deeper European 
integration (Germany with France), yet others 
because they want to bind non-EU neighbours 
closer to the European Union (the Polish-Ukrainian 
battalion, operational from the late 1990s to 2010), 
to build trust among neighbours with a history 
of troubled relations (Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, 
Greece, Macedonia, Turkey and Romania, which 
established a common brigade), or bolster their 
credentials as responsible stewards of their countries’ 
security. These are all valid reasons but they lead 
to different conclusions. For example, countries 
that primarily want to save money may focus on 
integrating relatively mundane (but costly) tasks 
such as training or logistics, whereas co-operation 
for the sake of encouraging EU integration is more 
likely to involve the creation of high-profile joint units 
(which, however, may not necessarily save money 
and could be difficult to deploy). If co-operation 
is to leave both partners satisfied, there has to be 
clarity and agreement from the beginning of the 
discussions among partners on what purpose the 
initiative is to serve, because this will determine the 
scope, form and depth of their common project.
•  The above criteria should not be interpreted as 
‘commandments’: some countries will manage to 
form defence partnerships despite failing to meet 
some of the criteria. But, as general rule, most 
countries that did successfully pool and share 
fulfilled most, if not all, of the above requirements. 
Perhaps the most important prescription that flows 
from the points above is this: a lot of factors have 
to align for pooling and sharing to succeed, so 
European cross-border defence integration will 
remain an exception rather than the rule. Because 
formation of joint units requires enormous trust and 
similarities, pooling and sharing is best done in 
discreet, regional ‘islands of co-operation’, whose 
members agree to enter into closer cooperation, 
and possibly to integrate the parts of their militaries 
in the long term.
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The four Visegrád countries (V4) did not need much 
convincing of the virtues of smart defense — even 
before Chicago, the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and 
Slovak governments vowed in a joint declaration 
to deepen military co-operation.6 Their motivation 
was to demonstrate that they are reliable allies — as 
frontier states they know that their reputation can 
be the decisive variable if and when they need 
help from the alliance. Moreover, three of the four 
Visegrád states have cut their defence budgets 
dramatically. Since the economic crisis began in 
2008, Hungary has decreased military spending by 29 
per cent, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic by 
22 and 16 per cent, respectively (NATO figures). They 
need collaboration to partly offset this steep financial 
cut. Without it, they risk becoming much diminished 
forces. 
Though their will to co-operate with each other 
seems beyond reproach, how suited are they to 
become an island of co-operation? How well do 
they do at meeting the criteria outlined above? Over 
the past year, the twelve DAV4 experts — authors of 
this report — have conducted an extensive survey 
of their defence establishments’ attitudes, and 
the countries’ political will and past experience 
with collaboration. The experts — a combination 
of officials, think-tankers and academicians — 
interviewed dozens of national defence officials 
and studied the V4 states’ strategic documents and 
records of past procurement decisions and military 
deployments. They have concluded that while there 
are some important differences among the member-
states, the V4 are in general well positioned to 
become a hub for military co-operation. Their future 
collaborative projects, however, will have to take the 
differences into account while capitalising on the 
similarities.
The following few pages survey how well the V4 states 
do in meeting the individual criteria for co-operation.
Similarity of strategic cultures
The V4 are fully integrated to NATO and the EU, and 
the common institutional framework is an advantage 
which, for example, the Nordic countries — the 
most prominent example of defence co-operation 
in Europe — do not enjoy. Moreover, the Visegrad 
countries have strong cultural and societal links, 
and share a common history, especially in the past 
century. 
Perhaps most importantly, their threat perceptions 
are similar, broadly focused on the possibility of 
threat from the East (though Poland’s worries are 
more acute than those in, for example, Hungary or 
Slovakia). While their security policies identify non-
military threats as more imminent, their defence 
doctrines and military policies do not exclude 
political-military threats, including missile attacks, 
which require the V4 to sustain territorial defence 
capabilities to deter low-scale conflicts of regional 
character. Such a structure of the armed forces has 
roots not only in the present strategic documents, 
but in the material legacy from the past — the V4 
inherited substantial conventional forces from the 
Warsaw Pact days.
This does not imply that the Visegrad countries focus 
on purely static defence – all four sent forces to 
NATO- and EU-led operations, including the ones 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past few years, 
they have acquired considerable amount of new 
equipment such as transport aircraft to make 
these far-flung missions possible. Their readiness 
to use force abroad and re-tool their militaries for 
overseas deployments has multiple reasons. They 
all see NATO as the main pillar of their security, and 
recognise the need for solidarity with other allies 
engaged in expeditionary operations. Participation 
in the multilateral operations also encourages 
transformation, intensifies training, and improves 
interoperability.
Not all V4 countries share the same propensity for 
risk: while all four have suffered casualties, including 
killed in action, their numbers greatly diverge. 
Slovakia, for example, has sent mostly combat 
support troops and, as a result, has not experienced 
loss of lives on scale that would test the sensitivity of 
the public to foreign deployments. Poland, on the 
other side, has been among the top contributors of 
combat units to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
suffering the highest number of casualties from 
among the Visegrad countries (making these 
deployments hugely unpopular). All four appear to 
share the sense that while participation in overseas 
NATO missions is important, there must be a limit to 
how many forces allies send abroad, particularly at 
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the time of economic crisis and the return of a more 
hard-line regime in Russia. Correspondingly, none 
contributed forces to the Libya operation (though 
this is also in part because few had meaningful 
assets to contribute to what was essentially a high-
intensity air-to-ground war). 
Paradoxically, while the V4 have taken risks – some 
great risks – on behalf of NATO, security policy 
and foreign deployments are not a prominent 
issue in public discourse in any of the Visegrad 
countries. Slovakia and Hungary in particular show 
few signs of public interest in the issue; the Czechs 
have had a more lively debate and the Poles 
most intense of all (partly because of a new re-
armament programme announced in 2012), but 
none even remotely resembling the discussions in 
Germany, the UK or the United States. The public 
ambivalence about foreign deployments – and 
the governments’ reluctance to make a public 
case for them – has made it difficult to sustain or 
increase the defence budgets: the missions are the 
armed forces’ main tasks and drive their equipment 
needs, but the public knows little about where and 
why the armed forces are being used. On the other 
hand, the relative silence about risks and dangers 
to NATO troops have made it easier for the political 
elites to send troops abroad. Slovaks accept the 
need to contribute forces to NATO operations and 
understand that it is expected from a member, but 
they do so with little enthusiasm. Similarly, Hungarians 
generally do not oppose foreign operations, but 
nor do they support them with much vigour. The 
armed forces in all V4 countries enjoy high levels of 
respect and acceptance, but this is in great part 
because they have continued to be active in the 
disaster relief and are often seen as a last resort in 
these situations, or – in case of Poland – because of 
the military’s historic role and because it is seen as 
a symbol of national identity.
The shared experience of NATO missions, together 
with a common institutional framework, the 
importance these countries accredit to the 
alliance and similarities in threat perception give 
the Visegrad countries good grounds to co-
operate. With comparable views on which military 
operations to join and which ones to abstain from, 
the odds are that V4 would also agree when and 
where to deploy their joint units in the future, should 
they build them. Because they face similar need 
to strengthen expeditionary capability, the V4 are 
likely to have comparable equipment needs (for 
example in the area of armoured vehicles). The 
more often they deploy forces in the same theatre, 
the more opportunities emerge for shared logistical, 
intelligence, force protection or engineering 
support. And the very experience of deploying 
in common operations strengthens the feeling of 
solidarity and unity among the V4.
Trust and solidarity
The expert group’s research indicates that while 
there is general trust among the four countries on 
the highest political levels, the bureaucratic and 
military establishments are much more suspicious of 
collaboration. 
The most common fear that our respondents 
voiced is that of ‘free-riding’: of a country (or 
countries) not contributing proportionally to joint 
activities. We have also heard concerns about 
Poland’s far greater size relative to its V4 kin, and 
whether its lopsided strength will make it difficult 
for Warsaw to take seriously the needs of its smaller 
partners. And Slovakia and Hungary continue to 
suffer from attempts among parts of their political 
establishments to paint each other as adversary. 
Similarly, previous failures at collaboration have 
dented trust among the V4, particularly the doomed 
attempts to jointly modernise Mi24 helicopters and 
T-72 tank and to co-ordinate acquisition of modern 
multi-role aircraft (with each country eventually 
proceeding to find a national solution). The Czechs 
and Slovaks cited bitterness about the way their 
previous joint battlegroup has been put together 
in 2009, with Czech officials disappointed at the 
quality of Slovak contributions, and the Slovaks 
complaining about the Czech management of 
their shared battlegroup. These past troubles and 
general anxieties will make it difficult to introduce 
some of the most promising elements of co-
operation, such as integration of units or personnel 
exchanges of officers at the ministries of defence, 
though a sub-regional co-operation of two or three 
Visegrad countries should be possible. 
What compensates for the low trust at the working 
level is the strong desire for co-operation among 
political elites and foreign ministries. They draw 
encouragement from successes in V4 collaboration 
on other subjects in the EU and NATO, where joint 
approach helped the Visegrad countries, for 
example, to make sure that the NATO Strategic 
Concept of 2010 reaffirms the importance of Art. 
V of the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, they are 
keen to reap the broader benefits: co-operation of 
all sorts, if properly thought-out and implemented, 
increases the level of trust among the four countries, 
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making the web of multilateral institutions denser, 
deeper and thus more stable, and preventing 
potential regional tensions, especially between 
Slovakia and Hungary. The foreign ministries are also 
mindful of the reputational benefits that successful 
collaborative projects would generate, especially 
among other NATO allies. In the last two or three 
years, the proponents of collaboration gained 
additional argument in the potential efficiencies 
which pooling and sharing can generate, thus 
offsetting declining defence budgets. Even the 
generally more sceptical defence ministries are 
showing renewed interest. 
However, given the less-than-enthusiastic support 
among parts of the government, collaboration 
will need to be approached gingerly. As argued 
later in this paper, co-operation should start with 
small initiatives with a high chance of success in 
the short-term. Early success would contribute to 
building trust at the echelons responsible for project 
implementation, and thus pave the way for more 
ambitious projects in the long-term. Some types of 
collaboration will find very little support at the V4-
level; Slovakia and Hungary, for example, may find 
it difficult to build joint frontline units. But in these 
cases, countries should be free to proceed with 
other V4 partners, with whom they share stronger 
bonds of trust – the Czechs and the Slovaks, for 
example, will be better placed for such sensitive 
collaboration. At the same time, even these two 
countries, should they proceed towards creation of 
joint units, would benefit from adoption of measures 
that give them assurance that their joint capabilities 
would be provided if needed. Measures such as 
budget lines specifically dedicated to deployment 
of shared units would give the participating countries 
confidence that their joint forces will be available in 
times of need. 
Transparency and predictability are also important 
principles, which help build trust among nations: the 
more countries know about each other’s plans, and 
the more they believe that their co-operation has 
future, the more reasons they have to trust each other. 
The establishment of regular meetings of Visegrad 
parliamentarians to discuss defence co-operation 
is one way to improve transparency. A good way 
to improve predictability is through the elaboration 
of a legal agreement acknowledging the countries’ 
long-term commitment to collaborate. Finally, if the 
countries are to be successful in their collaboration 
path, it is clear that a top-down approach must 
be applied in the present situation – where mistrust 
is unjustified or obscures other objectives, senior-
level proponents should be ready to overrule lower 
echelons. 
Size and quality
The Visegrad countries are obviously incomparable 
when it comes to the number of troops, military 
ambitions, annual budgets and quality of 
equipment. Poland is militarily superior to the rest 
of the group and is expected to assume the role of 
a regional power. This will present some challenges 
to collaboration, but it need not be a show-stopper. 
Poland’s population of 38 million outweighs the rest 
together, and the same applies to the countries’ 
armed forces. The strength of the Polish military 
currently stands at around 100,000 troops; more 
than the combined strength of the armed forces 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. This 
manpower is reflected in the country’s ability to 
send forces abroad. The ‘Polish Strategy for the 
Participation in International Operations’ adopted in 
2011 declares that Poland should be able to deploy 
around 3,200-3,800 troops overseas on a sustainable 
basis, which means that the total number of 
deployable troops equals around 12,000 (because 
for each deployed soldier another two need to 
be preparing to deploy or resting after a mission). 
For comparison, the Czechs are able to send on 
average 1,500 troops, the Hungarians 1,000 and 
the Slovaks 550. In addition to diverging numbers of 
troops, there is a major structural difference: Poland 
is the only Visegrad country with a navy. The other 
three countries are land-locked, which rules out the 
possibilities of co-operation in this area.
Poland is also the only Visegrad country whose 
defence budget is holding steady. Due to strong 
economic growth and statutory requirement 
keeping the defence budget at no less than 1.95% 
of GDP, the Polish armed forces have enjoyed 
a gradual increase in annual defence spending. In 
2011, the defence budget reached almost 6.7 billion 
euros, and has risen further in 2012. On the other 
hand, the militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia are heavily underfunded, struggling to 
keep their capabilities and credibility. Slovak and 
Czech defence budgets, for instance, presently 
stand at 1.11% of GDP, while the Hungarian one is 
estimated to fall under 1%. In addition to the overall 
defence budget of Poland, the share dedicated to 
capital investments has steadily risen as well. In 2011, 
it accounted for 16%, while in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary it was 13% and in Slovakia only 7% 
(NATO figures from 2011). 
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These budgetary differences as well as variances 
in defence policies in the past twenty years have 
led to divergences in quality, value and usefulness 
of weapons systems and other equipment used 
by individual Visegrad militaries today. Where 
a decade or two ago, the V4 possessed arsenals of 
comparable age and quality (which rendered them 
uniquely suited for collaboration on procurement 
or maintenance), by 2012 some V4 have already 
modernised while others have not. Poland and, to 
lesser extent, the Czech Republic belong to the 
first group, while Slovakia is the laggard among 
the V4. These inequalities explain why Poland also 
seeks defence co-operation partners beyond 
the Visegrad region; the most prominent being 
Germany, using some identical equipment, such as 
the Leopard tanks. Polish-German co-operation is 
particularly intense when it comes to exercises and 
military training (though they have stopped short 
of pooling and sharing). And Poland is also seeking 
to boost defence co-operation within the Weimar 
Triangle format or bilaterally with the United States, 
in order to further cement the country’s position as 
one of Europe’s top powers – a status which the 
Visegrad collaboration alone cannot bestow on 
Poland. 
Still, notwithstanding the differences in size, 
budgets, quality of equipment or ambitions, 
Poland seems to recognise strategic advantage 
that the co-operation with its smaller regional 
neighbours offers. If it came to be seen by other V4 
states as the region’s leader, this would enhance 
Warsaw’s importance vis-à-vis major European 
players, such as Germany, France and Great Britain. 
Moreover, Poland has been handling its rising power 
well, involving neighbours in its diplomatic initiatives 
(on matters so diverse as China and the future EU 
governance), thus giving other Visegrad partners 
fewer reasons to fear its domination – indeed, they 
seem to be warming up to Warsaw’s new role. The 
risk is that other V4 abuse Poland’s much larger size 
and willingness to lead as pretext for free-riding. 
Poland should not compromise on burden-sharing 
and demand a fair contribution from its partners; the 
others must contribute proportionally if they want V4 
pooling and sharing to succeed. 
Defence industries
Truly deep defence collaboration, such as the 
creation of joint units, may well spur opposition from 
some of the region’s defence companies. Joint 
procurement means that some companies will not 
win an order that they would have secured had 
all four countries procured individually. Ideally, the 
orders – as well as the lost opportunities – would 
be shared evenly among all V4 countries. But this 
presupposes that the V4 all have defence industries 
at similarly advanced technical level (so that they 
all have equally good shots at securing orders), 
their governments have comparable attitudes 
to their national defence industries (so that not 
one government protects its industry more than 
others), and the countries all focus on producing 
somewhat different goods (so that their companies 
complement each other, instead of competing). 
Alas, that is not the case. The V4 will need to think 
creatively to prevent differences in industrial policies 
from wrecking future collaboration. 
Polish defence industry is relatively large and 
concentrated, but at the same time inexperienced 
in multinational investment programmes or joint 
procurement. Its defence companies hesitate to 
operate in a competitive environment, pushing the 
government to protect it and postpone opening of 
the market (Poland initially opposed the EU defence 
procurement directive, which the Commission 
drafted in order to inject more competition into 
military procurement). Polish defence companies 
focus mainly on securing contracts with the 
country’s defence ministry or less technologically 
demanding Asian customers, though there are some 
projects, which might be attractive for European 
partners as well, such as the new generation of air 
defence systems. 
The Czechs see defence industrial collaboration 
with Poland as potentially valuable way to assimilate 
new technologies and win a foothold in the (much 
larger) Polish market. But the Czechs have been 
frustrated by the Polish government’s protectionist 
attitude. At the end of the day, they often choose 
to co-operate with the easy-to-deal Slovaks, even if 
the technological benefits of such joint projects may 
be much more limited. Both Slovak and Hungarian 
defence industries are small. Few of their companies 
produce purely military goods anymore; most have 
civilian business on the side. Although Bratislava 
and Budapest do care about domestic companies, 
their interests seem to present lesser challenge for 
regional co-operation, especially because financial 
austerity is forcing government to abandon costly 
subsidies for inefficient industries. 
It is clear that opening of national procurement 
programmes to competitors among the V4 may 
hurt some uncompetitive companies, though 
the case might be made that those would suffer 
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from shrinking budgets anyway. For those who 
are more apt at competition, co-operation may 
present a way to improve their chances to expand 
abroad and survive. But because those competitive 
companies tend to be concentrated in Poland 
and, to lesser extent, the Czech Republic, friction is 
very likely. The Slovaks and the Hungarians may be 
tempted to insist on distributing the work among all 
four states as a way of propping up their companies. 
But such ‘juste retour’ approach has led to costly 
cost overruns in the past; it also virtually guarantees 
delays in delivery. The V4 will need to find a different 
approach; one that we spell out below (see 
‘Navigating obstacles to co-operation’).
Clarity of intentions
The militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia have been severely hit by the current 
economic crisis. Their defence budgets are 
shrinking and capabilities are difficult to expand 
or even sustain. Though the countries understand 
that co-operation will not miraculously generate 
significant savings, they nevertheless expect it to 
help them mitigate the consequences of financial 
downturn. The emerging regional defence 
collaboration is essentially a (budgetary) ‘crisis 
management’ operation to them, conducted by 
heavily underfunded defence ministries (except 
for Poland), which seek to save money on logistics, 
maintenance or training while giving themselves 
the opportunity to acquire items which would be 
unaffordable on national basis.
Poland, too, is interested in all the capability-
related benefits that collaboration offers. But it also 
has a geopolitical goal in mind: it seeks to play 
a prominent role in the region, enjoying the respect 
of its neighbours and prestige among Europe’s large 
countries. Poland also seeks to strengthen the two 
institutional cornerstones of Polish national security: the 
EU and NATO. V4 military co-operation with Warsaw 
at its core allows Poland to establish leadership in 
Central Europe. And by steering this co-operation 
towards building up an EU Battlegroup (more on 
which below), Poland also strengthens the EU. 
The rest of the group also consider NATO and the 
EU as the ultimate guarantors of security. But while 
Poland, as a big country, focuses on substantial 
capability contributions in order to reinforce these 
institutions, its regional partners place greater 
emphasis on improving their reputation as reliable 
allies, demonstrating their strategic maturity and 
proving themselves to be security producers rather 
than consumers. They are looking for symbolism, and 
sometimes place less emphasis on contributing real 
capabilities to NATO and EU operations – as long 
as they are seen as fulfilling their duties. Were they 
to apply the same philosophy to V4 collaboration, 
Poland would come to see others as free-riders. 
Within each V4 country, there are differences 
among priorities of actors on the national level as 
well. The foreign ministries tend to regard V4 defence 
collaboration as a tool for improving political 
standing in the region, NATO and the EU; they pay 
less attention to capabilities delivered. The defence 
ministries worry about capabilities first and foremost, 
though from different angles – the Poles want to add 
to their military strength by securing contribution to 
joint units from other V4 countries; they in turn look to 
collaboration mostly as a way of spreading existing 
expenses among more participants, thus lowering 
costs. 
Last but not least, the Visegrad countries are also 
aware that defence co-operation could increase 
the level of trust among countries in the region, make 
the V4 more deeply and densely institutionalised and 
thus prevent tensions. This rationale is particularly 
attractive for the Hungarians and Slovaks, who have 
experienced problems in mutual relations.
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nAVigATing obsTAcles To co-opeRATion
With important qualifications and nuances as 
presented above, the Visegrad countries mostly 
harbour similar expectations of their co-operation 
and – importantly – understand the differences 
between them. Their desire to co-operate has 
strengthened with time, as has their willingness to 
overcome obstacles to closer military partnership. 
What is needed now is a ‘roadmap’ of sorts; a guide 
on now to navigate future difficulties, along with 
ideas for specific projects. We offer both on the 
following pages. The experts’ research into regional 
similarities and differences suggests that the V4 
states have the greatest chance to successfully 
forge defence collaboration if they observe the 
following principles: 
•  Caution yet ambition: To build trust, and to 
eliminate residual suspicions stemming from 
previous unsuccessful joint projects, the V4 should 
start collaborating on capabilities such as training 
and education that will raise fewer sensitivities 
than co-operation in other military activities. 
But they should not stop here; their goal should 
be to convert the trust that smaller projects 
generate into a determination to pursue more 
ambitious projects. Real economies of scale lie 
not in small steps such as academic exchanges 
but in deeper co-operation, such as partial or 
complete integration of units or facilities. This 
report therefore groups its recommendations into 
two categories: it starts with relatively modest 
proposals for the near-term time frame (0-3 years), 
on the understanding that success in those areas 
will allow the V4 to proceed into the second 
category: that of ‘game-changing’ projects.
•  Pragmatism: V4 defence collaboration must bring 
real military benefits, not be undertaken for co-
operation’s sake. Countries should focus on those 
initiatives that allow them to preserve existing 
capabilities, or to gain access to capabilities 
which they typically would not be able to procure 
independently. Governments should feel free to 
discard project ideas that, on closer examination, 
turn out unworkable: the measure of success 
should not be how many joint projects there are 
but how effective they are at allowing the V4 to 
maintain or cultivate needed capabilities.
•  NATO and EU focus: These two institutions remain 
the key drivers of defence planning, and the 
most likely vehicles for deployment of V4 armed 
forces. The purpose of Visegrad collaboration is 
not to create a regional alternative to NATO or 
the EU but to reinforce the two organisations by 
improving the V4 countries’ ability to contribute 
to collective missions and ambitions. To this end, 
the Visegrad collaborative projects should aim 
to directly address NATO’s and EU’s capability 
gaps, or to free up resources, which will permit 
the V4 countries to plug those gaps individually. 
As much as possible, the V4 should seek to 
embed future collaboration within the NATO 
and EU frameworks such as ‘smart defence’ or 
the European Defence Agency’s multinational 
projects. They also ought to consider pledging 
those capabilities that they plan to develop 
jointly towards NATO’s ‘capability targets’, and to 
make recourse of NATO’s new ability to establish 
regional, rather than national, capability targets. 
Such integration may make it easier to implement 
future collaborative proposals as the V4 could 
make use of existing funds and know-how in 
NATO and the EU.
•  Variable geometry: Because the V4 countries are 
of different size and have different equipment, 
they will not all co-operate to the same depth, 
and on the same projects. One key organising 
principle should be that of ‘variable geometry’: 
while all projects should be open to all interested 
V4 parties, countries should be free not to join, and 
allow a smaller cluster to proceed without them. 
Equally, the V4 format must not be exclusive – 
each of the countries involved has other bilateral 
relationships that it will want to preserve. Countries 
from outside V4 should be allowed to join on 
a project-by-project basis. Indeed, countries such 
as Austria, Croatia, or Ukraine have expressed 
DAV4 Full Report  |   11
 General Principles
interest in collaboration with one or more V4 
countries – where practicable, those requests 
should be entertained.
•  Align defence mindsets and strategic cultures: 
Defence collaboration is as much about mindsets 
as about specific projects. It requires that 
countries start to think of defence capabilities 
as something that they build on a regional basis, 
rather than a purely national one. This approach 
is quite different from how the V4 defence and 
political establishments operate today. Despite 
past examples of collaboration, their first instinct 
is to acquire each new capability at home (if 
possible), and alone. The governments can and 
should start taking measures that will overtime 
establish collaboration as the default position, 
not an exception. These ‘strategic alignment’ 
measures (listed below) should include expanded 
co-ordination of defence policies, leading to 
the closest possible harmonisation of defence 
planning.
•  Undercapacity and overcapacity both need to 
be addressed: The V4 countries have facilities 
and capabilities, which are not being used to 
their fullest potential, and the sharing of which 
can create significant economies of scale. For 
example, they inherited from Warsaw Pact days 
training ranges and military colleges built for 
needs of much bigger armies than they have 
today. Conversely, the V4 also have significant 
shortfalls in certain skills and equipment, such as 
in helicopters. Where those needs overlap, they 
should explore the possibility of joint acquisition, 
maintenance and personnel training aimed at 
closing those shortfalls. Measures addressing 
overcapacity tend to raise fewer sensitivities, and 
could be undertaken first. Measures addressing 
shortfalls, such as joint acquisition and operation 
of defence equipment, will be more politically 
delicate but could make the difference between 
V4 countries possessing certain capabilities in 
future or losing them to the economic crisis. They 
should be undertaken in mid-term perspective, 
with emphasis on pragmatism, NATO and 
EU needs, and observation of the ‘variable 
geometry’ principle. 
•  Smart industrial approach: Each of the V4 countries 
has somewhat different defence industry and 
different attitudes to defence industry, as argued 
above. This is a challenge, but not an obstacle 
to co-operation: other clusters of countries have 
managed to work together quite closely despite 
industrial differences – Britain and France come 
to mind. In distributing industrial participation, the 
V4 should eschew the ‘juste retour’ approach, 
under which each country seeks a share of each 
project (which has led to cost overruns in the 
past). Instead, they should adopt the principle of 
‘global balance’: countries should accept that 
joint orders will go entirely to the country that 
is best suited to produce the given good, but 
over the lifetime of co-operation, each country 
should receive a proportionally fair share of 
such orders. This approach assumes that all V4 
preserve healthy defence industrial sectors. They 
have more reasons than ever to do so: the EU 
directive on defence procurement (2009/81) is 
starting to inject more cross-border competition 
into defence procurement. The V4, along with 
the rest of the EU, will need to work hard to 
improve competitiveness of defence companies, 
including through greater collaboration.
•  Lay the political and legal ground for co-operation: 
Truly deep forms of military collaboration such as 
integration of military assets or joint procurement 
require that the participating governments believe 
that their defence relationship has a future. 
One way to make sure that it does is for the 
governments to sign a declaration, memorandum 
of understanding or – ideally – a long-term treaty 
on co-operation (as Britain and France did). 
Equally, the V4 would have more confidence 
in their collaboration if each government, 
individually, agreed a binding, national multi-year 
defence budget and procurement perspective. 
Such arrangement, whose different versions are 
already in place in Poland or France, for example, 
would send a signal that collaborative projects will 
be properly resourced.
•  Learning from others, exporting lessons: Defence 
collaboration is new to most countries in Europe. 
Many others are grappling with dilemmas similar 
to those of the V4: looking for new approaches, 
ideas, and solutions to problems. In exploring 
future collaboration, the V4 should make full 
recourse to lessons learned in other countries. 
Moreover, they should take the lead in the EU and 
NATO in designing a structured way to identify, 
distribute and harvest experiences from defence 
collaboration in all parts of the EU and NATO, using 
the respective organisations’ capacities. To the 
V4, defence collaboration is also an opportunity 
to become the thought leaders on this important 
security issue, which in itself can bring reputational 
benefits to the Visegrad countries.
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FRom TheoRy To pRAcTice: FuTuRe V4 pRojecTs
Over the past several months, the group of experts 
has studied a number of possible joint projects. They 
have drawn on many useful ideas developed by 
the V4 governments, including those contained in 
the ‘Responsibility for a strong NATO’ declaration 
or the (draft) Czech-Slovak agreement on defence 
collaboration. The list below develops this work 
by offering a sense of timelines and suggesting 
the order of priorities. The list is not meant to be 
comprehensive – other collaborative projects are 
possible and will no doubt materialise. The reason for 
selecting some ideas over others was to highlight the 
most important areas for co-operation: those, which 
most directly address NATO and EU capabilities or 
hold the promise of creating substantial economies 
of scale. 
cApAbiliTy DeVelopmenT
Short-term (0-3 years): 
•  The V4 chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) defence battalion: a permanent 
capability, drawing on expertise contained in 
the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in 
Vyškov, Czech Republic and Polish leadership of 
the counter-CBRN NATO Response Force module 
in 2009, as well as existing CBRN knowledge in 
Hungary and Slovakia. While the inauguration of 
such battalion, and certainly its lifetime, will fall 
outside the 0-3 years’ time horizon, the V4 countries 
should in the near term agree the modalities of 
its work, identify the division of labour, and start 
investing into those national CBRN elements that 
will form a part of the joint battalion. Regional 
co-operation on CBRN will provide the V4 with 
the opportunity to further develop their relevant 
capabilities even at the time of constrained 
finances, and to implement their stated ambition 
to become the leading CBRN specialists in NATO. 
CBRN is a sought-after capability for both out-of-
area and territorial defence missions; moreover, 
a quickly deployable CBRN battalion will also be 
highly useful in cases of industrial disasters in the V4 
and beyond.
•  The V4 cyber defence initiative: the V4 should 
consider developing a long-term mechanism 
for regional cyber security co-operation: regular 
exchange of information, joint training and the 
establishment of procedures for mutual assistance 
in the event of a large-scale cyber-attack. At its 
core should be close co-operation among the V4 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), 
responsible for governmental communication 
networks and large-area systems running the critical 
infrastructure, as well as their military counterparts, 
responsible for protecting military communication 
and information networks. The initiative should 
make full use of the experience and capabilities 
of the NATO cyber defence Centre of Excellence 
in Tallinn as well as other allied institutions dealing 
with cyber security; it should also be open to co-
operation with the EU’s ENISA agency (European 
Network and Security Information Agency). 
The V4 collaboration on cyber security makes 
all the more sense because elements of the 
participating countries’ vital networks are already 
interconnected, and the protection of those bits 
requires co-operation. Further, increased cyber 
security co-operation would also add to the V4 
countries’ political weight in NATO.
Long-term (3+ years): 
•  The V4 (+ Ukraine) EU Battlegroup (BG): already 
agreed at the V4 level, the Battlegroup is the most 
significant regional project; it also holds a real long-
term transformative value. In order to preserve the 
relationships and the habit of co-operation that 
will have been fostered in the process of building 
the BG, the participating states should turn it into 
a semi-permanent asset, which will be on rotation 
on a predictable basis (for example every four 
years), in the V4+ format. They should also launch, 
at earliest possible time, a continuous lessons-
learned process to accompany the preparatory 
work and the Battlegroup’s 2016 stand-up 
period: this would enable early identification 
of emerging problems, which might hamper 
the timely establishment of the BG. A proper 
lesson-learned process would also allow the V4 
to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and challenges of mutual military co-operation 
in general. In the long run, the V4 should aim at 
permanently integrating some nucleus capabilities 
required to build a BG, which could then also be 
used independently of the Battlegroup – the most 
promising seem to be medical support, logistics, 
engineering or even command and control 
capability for the BG. The Battlegroup could also 
be established as a more flexible force than the 
original BG concept foresees, with additional 
civilian components, and assigned a broader 
scope of tasks (which would allow the V4 states 
to make use of BG components for non-military 
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duties, too). The emphasis on the Battlegroup is not 
to suggest that the V4 countries prioritise EU over 
NATO: when it comes to capabilities, what is good 
for the EU is also good for NATO. Both institutions 
will benefit if the V4 use collaboration to preserve 
high intensity, short readiness capabilities, which 
would otherwise fall victim to budget cuts.
•  Joint V4 air policing: to be initiated by filling in 
the emerging Slovak capability gap with fighters 
from Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. 
While, self-evidently, it would come into existence 
only if Slovakia made a decision to retire its Mig-
29 fighters without replacement, the launch of 
joint V4 air policing over Slovakia would need 
to be preceded by considerable preparatory 
work including legal, operational and financial 
modalities. The V4 could start a feasibility study 
now, without predetermining whether the 
common air policing would eventually materialise. 
This study could be based on experiences from 
other NATO air policing operations such as the 
one in the Baltic states, in which Poland and 
Czech Republic took part. If implemented, a joint 
V4 air policing arrangement would allow Slovakia 
to use the money that would otherwise go to new 
fighter aircraft to take the lead in developing 
other niche capabilities for the benefit of the V4, 
such as counter-improvised explosive devices 
(IED) technology. Over time, V4 air policing over 
Slovakia could become a common effort to 
guard the whole V4 airspace on a collaborative 
basis, under a system of rotational combat duties, 
followed by joint pilot training and exercises.
TRAining AnD eDucATion
Short-term (0-3 years):
•  Multinational aviation training centre for helicopter 
pilots: it would build on existing assets, primarily in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, and specialise 
in training Mil helicopter pilots, not only from the 
V4 but also from NATO partner countries. The 
project is already listed among NATO ‘Tier 1’ smart 
defence projects, with the Czech Republic as 
lead nation and Hungary a participant, alongside 
others. 
•  Joint counter-IED centre: it would build on the 
V4 countries’ experience in operations, and the 
knowledge contained in the explosive ordnance 
disposal Centre of Excellence in Slovakia. The 
V4 would pool their research and training in the 
centre, use it to conduct lessons learned exercises, 
and to develop new counter IED technologies. 
Tighter collaboration among defence academies: 
as a first step towards the partial integration of higher 
military education, the V4 should agree to specialise 
in particular courses (this would also allow the V4 
states to exploit their niche capabilities and share 
their unique experiences from developing and using 
them). A co-ordinated approach to specialisation 
would create a virtual ‘common curriculum’. English 
should be the common language – this also means 
that specialisation, at least initially, should apply only 
to the most senior staff courses, whose participants 
are expected to speak advanced English. 
Long-term (3+ years):
•  V4 military academy: a common, multinational 
institution of higher learning for senior staff courses; 
with English as common language, based on 
the territory of one of the V4 states. It could be 
modelled after the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, 
which educates general staff officers and senior 
civil servants from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The creation of such joint college would eliminate 
the need for the existence of duplicate senior 
level courses in the four countries, allowing the 
governments to re-focus some of their resources 
away from education towards other capabilities. 
At the same time, a joint college – assuming that 
the participating states send their best instructors 
to it – would improve the quality of senior level 
military education and narrow differences among 
the V4 countries’ strategic cultures.
sTRATegic AlignmenT
Short-term (0-3 years):
•  A joint declaration, memorandum of understanding 
or a treaty: this would outline a vision for future co-
operation as well as its structure and the general 
principles to guide it, along the lines of those 
offered above. A legal agreement, especially if 
underpinned with parliamentary approval, would 
also steel collaborative projects against the effects 
of political changes in the V4 governments, and 
give participating countries the assurances that 
they will have access in the future to commonly 
built capabilities.
•  Closer V4 co-ordination on the political level: the 
four countries, via the offices of political directors 
at the ministries of defence or heads of security 
departments at the MFAs, should work towards the 
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establishment of joint positions on the distribution 
of staff positions in NATO and EU structures, and on 
allocation of common funds. 
•  Joint V4 proposal for how to strengthen further 
NATO’s ability to encourage defence collaboration 
beyond Chicago: the Visegrad countries should 
collaborate on addressing the key challenges 
involved: how can NATO identify and evaluate 
opportunities for cross-border collaboration? How 
can it better monitor progress in implementing 
joint projects and facilitate the sharing of lesson-
learned on overcoming obstacles to pooling and 
sharing? Can the alliance address the challenge 
of start-up costs of collaboration projects, and that 
of countries losing access to needed equipment 
when they embrace specialisation? 
Long-term (3+ years): 
•  Agreement on embedding defence planners 
at each other’s defence ministries: this would 
allow countries to better understand each 
other’s equipment needs and replacement 
timelines, laying the ground for future 
harmonisation of procurement cycles. This, in turn, 
is a key prerequisite for common acquisition of 
future defence equipment. The postings should 
take place on a reciprocal and flexible basis: 
some tandems within V4, such as the Czech and 
Slovaks, may be more open to such cross-posting 
than other combinations of countries. 
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The mAking oF The RepoRT
The Expert Group first gathered in autumn 2011 at 
the Smart Security conference in Bratislava and 
soon after at the Chateau Bela Strategic Forum held 
in southern Slovakia, in order to elaborate research 
methodology and set the agenda of the project. 
The experts started their research by exploring best 
practices from other countries. In January 2012, they 
undertook a trip to Norway and Sweden to discuss 
Nordic Defence Co-operation with senior defence 
officials including the Norwegian minister of defence. 
A month later, the group undertook a visit to Brussels, 
for conversations with senior officials and diplomats 
about NATO’s expectations for the Chicago Sum-
mit. In the meantime, the experts were conduct-
ing ground research at home: they were consulting 
their respective ministries about procurement plans 
and schedules, military ambitions and appetite for 
collaboration. During the Visegrad Ministerial Meet-
ing held in Prague in March 2012, the expert group 
members met with top figures in the Visegrad for-
eign ministries and of the Ministry of Defence of the 
Czech Republic. This helped them to formulate po-
litically realistic yet ambitious recommendations for 
mutual collaboration among the V4 countries. The 
preliminary results were presented at the GLOBSEC 
Bratislava Global Security Forum, held on April 12-14, 
2012. The GLOBSEC Forum was the last of the major 
security-related conferences before the NATO Chi-
cago Summit and was an ideal platform to discuss 
common Visegrad military projects for the alliance’s 
meeting. The time between GLOBSEC and the NATO 
Chicago Summit was used by the expert group and 
the representatives of the V4 ministries of foreign af-
fairs and defence for co-operation and discussion on 
the final version of the document as well as its use in 
the official positions for the Summit.
DAV4 pRojecT
DAV4, or „Defence Austerity: A New Paradigm for 
Defence and Security Cooperation in the Visegrad 
Region“ is a project of the Slovak Atlantic Commis-
sion and its Visegrad partners (International Centre 
for Democratic Transition, Jagello 2000 and Polish 
Institute of International Affairs), supported by the 
International Visegrad Fund. It was initiated with two
goals in mind: First, to explore the most cost-effe tive, 
politically feasible and militarily useful areas of de-
fence co-operation among the Visegrad countries. 
Second, to establish regional defence collaboration 
as one of the top priorities for the Visegrad frame-
work, and to build its top-down support. The final out-
put of the project is a report composed of two parts: 
The present Report contains a set of principles and 
projects, which the DAV4 expert group recommends 
the governments focus on. The extended Study con-
tains a more in-depth analysis of the possible collab-
oration initiatives based on the specific needs of the 
Visegrad countries.
16   |   DAV4 Full Report
ABOUT
expeRT gRoup
The DAV4 Expert Group on defence collaboration includes current and former senior officials and analysts 
from Visegrad countries: 
Jiří Schneider
First Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Prague;
Jozef Bátora
Associate Professor, FSES,
Comenius University in Bratislava;
Gareth Chapell
Research Fellow, Polish Institute
of International Affairs, Warsaw
(Member of group until March
2012)
Gen. (Ret.) Jiří Šedivý
Former Chief of Defence Staff, 
Prague;
Attila Demkó
Head of Defence Planning, 
Ministry of Defence, Budapest;
Marcin Terlikowski
Research Fellow, Polish Institute 
of International Affairs, Warsaw;
Amb. István Gyarmati
President, Centre for Democracy 
Public Foundation, Budapest;
Gen. (Ret.) László Tömböl
Former Chief of Defence Staff, 
Budapest;
Jan Jireš
Director Centre of Transatlantic 
Relations, CEVRO Institut, Prague;
Tomáš Valášek
President, Central European 
Policy Institute; Member of 
the Board, Slovak Atlantic 
Commission
Amb. Rastislav Káčer
President, Slovak Atlantic 
Commission, Bratislava;
Marcin Zaborowski
Director, Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, Warsaw; 
©  Central European Policy Institute - A think-tank by the Slovak Atlantic Commission - November 15, 2012
This report was published with the support of the International Visegrad Fund.
sloVAk ATlAnTic commission | cenTRAl euRopeAn policy insTiTuTe
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic, +421 2 544 106 09
sac@ata-sac.org | www.ata-sac.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
